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Reconsidering Disclosure and Liability in the Transatlantic
Capital Markets
Mark K. Brewer, Orla Gough, & Neeta S. Shah*
The history of global finance since 1980 has ... been one of fright-
eningly expensive financial crises-expensive not just in terms of
the costs to the taxpayer or of output foregone, but in terms of the
shattered lives of innocent victims. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the global recession, governments around the world
are introducing financial regulation reforms and pledging increased
global coordination of regulatory efforts. While these reforms will in-
troduce some of the most significant changes to financial regulation
since the Great Depression, they fail to fundamentally alter the cur-
rent overreliance on disclosure and fail to achieve international coop-
eration in deterring the next financial crisis. This article aims to
explore some of the limits of disclosure as a basis for financial regula-
tion and suggests that international regulatory coordination of liability
standards can help curtail the risky behavior that often leads to the
pattern of boom and bust in the global financial markets. The pur-
pose of this article is to evaluate previous research challenging the
assumption that disclosure of information forms a sufficient basis for
regulating securities, as well as to call for more rigorous enforcement
of existing laws and cooperation on standards of liability by regulators
in the United States ("U.S.") and the European Union ("EU").
The U.S. and the United Kingdom (U.K.), along with the other
member states of the EU, have explored a number of measures to
deter future financial crises. Such cooperation builds upon previous
commitments to cooperate on financial regulation. Following the
wave of corporate scandals in the early 2000s, including those involv-
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ing Enron, WorldCom and Parmalat, the European Securities and
Markets Authority (ESMA) 2 and the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) 3 have pledged to pursue convergence of norms,
standards, and regulations in the transatlantic capital markets to
achieve the creation of a barrier-free market.4 A true transatlantic
market in securities, 5 supervised by regulators on both sides of the
Atlantic6 as well as by other marketplace actors, could greatly en-
hance efficiency. 7 However, in addition to working toward conver-
gence in national disclosure standards (which currently form the basis
of securities regulation in both the U.S. and the EU),8 cooperation on
enforcement and levels of liability for wrongdoing could greatly en-
hance investor protection. In particular, governments should agree on
common liability standards which can disincentivize overly risky
behavior.
2. ESMA is an independent EU Authority that attempts to maintain the stability of the Euro-
pean market and enhance investor protection. See EUROPEAN SECURITIES AND MARKETS Au-
THORITY, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: A GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING ESMA 3 (2011),
available at http://www.esma.europa.eu/popup2.php?id=7366. In contrast to the SEC, ESMA
does not have enforcement powers over securities issuers, but it can issue recommendations. Id.
at 5.
3. Founded by the U.S. Congress in 1934, the Securities Exchange Commission has the task of
enforcing securities laws, promoting stability in the securities markets and protecting investors.
See The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and
Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC.oov, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited
Jan. 18, 2011).
4. See SEC PRESS RELEASE 2004-75, SEC-CESR SET OUT THE SHAPE OF FUTURE COLLABO-
RATION (June 4, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-75.htm.
5. The academic literature offers two means of harmonization. See Eric J. Pan, Harmoniza-
tion of U.S.-EU Securities Regulation: The Case for a Single European Securities Regulator, 34
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 499, 504 (2003). First, the EU and the U.S. could pursue harmoniza-
tion by implementing mandatory rules applicable to all issuers. Id. Second, regulatory competi-
tion in which both the EU and the U.S. permit issuers to select the regime which is most
efficacious could also achieve harmonization. Id. at 504-05 citing, inter alia, Roberta Romano,
Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998);
Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach
of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998); and Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors
Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 279 (2000).
6. Experts have even called for a single European regulator to act in conjunction with the
SEC. See generally Pan, supra note 5, at 534-35. Currently, the regulators in Europe are na-
tional, including, among others, the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt far
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin)) in Germany and the Financial Services Authority (FSA)
in the United Kingdom.
7. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Conver-
gence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 641, 683-91 (1999).
8. Iris H-Y Chiu, Delegated Regulatory Administration in Mandatory Disclosure-Some Ob-
servations from EU Securities Regulation, 40 INT'L LAW. 737, 739 (2006) (noting that "[t]he
mandatory disclosure regulation for public offers is a foundational form of securities regulation,
whether in the United States or in the EU.").
RECONSIDERING DISCLOSURE AND LIABILITY
Part II of this Article will briefly survey the current financial regula-
tory environment in the U.S. and in the EU, with an emphasis on the
U.K. 9 Part III will summarize the weaknesses of disclosure as the ba-
sis of a securities regulation regime. 10 Finally, this article will survey
international efforts to regulate securities as well as make proposals to
extend cooperation from the formulation of international disclosure
standards to the setting of liability standards as well as enforcement of
such standards by national regulators.'1
II. CURRENT FINANCIAL REGULATION IN THE U.S. AND EU
A. United States
In the United States, the SEC has the authority to regulate the se-
curities markets, 12 and both federal and state laws13 form the legal
framework for regulating the sale of securities.14 In the aftermath of
the Great Depression, the United States adopted a securities regula-
tions system based on mandatory disclosure and registration. 15 The
system has been summarized as follows:
The logic is that by arming investors with information, mandatory
disclosure promotes informed investor decision making, capital
market integrity, and capital market efficiency. Once they are em-
powered with information, the argument goes, investors can protect
themselves against corporate abuses and mismanagement, and there
is no need for the government to engage in more substantive securi-
ties regulation - merit review in the parlance.16
9. See infra notes 12-178 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 183-225 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 226-65 and accompanying text.
12. See generally Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULA-
TION 37-51 (4th ed. 2001) (describing the SEC's remit of administrative authority); id. at 56-61
(describing the SEC's organization and rules).
13. State laws are called "blue sky laws." See generally HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SA-
MUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW, part XI, § 26.1 (2d ed. 2004). The
term "blue sky" denotes the purpose of state securities laws: they are designed to prevent "spec-
ulative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky." Id. (quoting Hall v.
Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917)).
14. See generally Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 12, at 9-56 (describing the development of
state and federal law).
15. Irina Shirinyan, The Perspective of U.S. Securities Disclosure and the Process of Globaliza-
tion, 2 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 515, 520 (2004) (citing Frode Jensen, III, The Attractions of the
U.S. Securities Markets to Foreign Issuers and the Alternative Methods of Accessing the U.S. Mar-
kets: From a Legal Perspective, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S25, S26-S27 (1994). See generally
Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Trans-
parency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1209-35 (1999) (discussing the use of disclosure as a regulatory
mechanism); Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 12, at 114-80 (describing the procedure and content
for securities registrations).
16. Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for
Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 417, 418 (2003).
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This disclosure-based regime is built on the premise that providing
investors with all material information will lead to the most rational
investment decisions and in the long-run, the highest levels of effi-
ciency in the capital markets. 17
Financial regulation has depended on whether a particular instru-
ment constitutes a "security" in which case regulation falls within the
SEC's regulatory authority.18 Financial instruments which do not fall
within the concept of a security are supervised by other regulators,
most notably the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC),
which has had some authority for regulating derivatives. The regula-
tion of banking activities is not within the authority granted to either
the SEC or the CFTC, and as such falls outside the scope of this arti-
cle. 19 Widespread disagreement on how to classify credit derivatives 20
- the instruments which lay at the heart of the subprime mortgage
crisis - has caused difficulty in assigning regulatory responsibility for
regulating such financial instruments.21 In the wake of the subprime
mortgage crisis, efforts are under way to clearly assign joint responsi-
bility to the CFTC and the SEC to regulate derivative financial instru-
ments.22 The lack of regulatory supervision for derivative instruments
illustrates the damaging consequences of financial innovation that is
not suitably regulated. The U.S.'s rule-based system 23 applies not
only to U.S. companies but also extraterritorially to non-U.S.
issuers.24
17. See generally Frank Jan de Graff & Cynthia A. Williams, The Intellectual Foundations of
the Global Financial Crisis: Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 32 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 390,
393-94 (2009) (describing the neoclassical economic assumptions underlying the efficient capital
markets hypothesis).
18. See generally Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 12, at 201-77 (discussing the statutory defini-
tion and judicial interpretation of the term "security").
19. For an analysis of the tension between the regulatory authority of the SEC and U.S. bank-
ing regulators, see Eugene F. Maloney, Banks and the SEC: A Regulatory Mismatch, 25 ANN.
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 443 (2006) (arguing that the SEC and banking regulators should work
together to improve the oversight of banking securities activities and enhance investor
protection).
20. See generally Lily Tijoe, Credit Derivatives: Regulatory Challenges in an Exploding Indus-
try, 26 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 387 (2007) (discussing the problems associated with as-
signing responsibility for regulating derivatives).
21. Colleen M. Baker, Regulating the Invisible: The Case of Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1317 (2010).
22. Id. at 1336-38.
23. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus Prin-
ciples Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023 (2003).
24. Anupama J. Naidu, Was Its Bite Worse than Its Bark? The Costs Sarbanes-Oxley Imposes
on German Issuers May Translate into Costs to the United States, 18 EMORY Ir'L L. REV. 271,
271-72 (2004).
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Several federal statutes form the basic regulatory framework, in-
cluding the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act"), 25 the Ex-
change Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"), 26 the Trust Indenture Act
of 1939,27 the Investment Company Act of 1940,28 the Investment Ad-
visors Act of 1940,29 the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,30 and the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the
"Dodd-Frank Act").31 Due to the wide scope of these laws, this Arti-
cle focuses only on the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, Sarbanes-
Oxley, and the Dodd-Frank Act.32
1. Securities Act
The Securities Act regulates the initial distribution of securities by
an issuer.33 With certain limited exceptions,34 § 5 of the Securities Act
makes it illegal for any person to offer to sell or buy any security un-
less the security is registered with the SEC.35 The SEC regulates the
sale of securities through requiring issuers to disclose certain informa-
25. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a-77aa (LexisNexis through P.L. 111-359 (with a gap of P.L. 111-350)).
26. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a-77jj (LexisNexis through P.L. 111-359 (with a gap of P.L. 111-350)).
27. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77aaa-77bbb (LexisNexis through P.L. 111-359 (with a gap of P.L. 111-
350)).
28. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (LexisNexis through P.L. 111-359 (with a gap of P.L. 111-
350)).
29. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80b- to 80-b21 (LexisNexis through P.L. 111-359 (with a gap of P.L. 111-
350)).
30. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7201-66 (LexisNexis through P.L. 111-359 (with a gap of P.L. 111-350)).
31. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-203 (2010).
32. The statutes not included herein regulate interstate holding companies concerned with
trust indentures which publicly issue more than $5 million worth of debt securities, Trust Inden-
ture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77aaa-77bbb (LexisNexis through P.L. 111-359 (with a gap of
P.L. 111-350)); companies which either have the primary purpose of investing securities or hold-
ing, trading, investing, reinvesting, or owning certain securities which account for more than
forty percent of the value of their assets, Investment Company Act of 1940 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80a-1
to 80a-64 (LexisNexis through P.L. 111-359 (with a gap of P.L. 111-350)); and investment advi-
sors who give advice on securities if not incidental to a brokerage business, Investment Advisers
Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80b- to 80-b21 (LexisNexis through P.L. 111-359 (with a gap of P.L.
111-350)).
33. See generally Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 12, at 38.
34. Exemptions exist for certain transactions and particular types of securities. The most com-
mon transaction exemptions include 15 U.S.C.A. § 77(c)(11) (LexisNexis through P.L. 111-359
(with a gap of P.L. 111-350)), which allows intrastate offers and sales only; § 77(d), which allows
for private placements, i.e., where no public offer is made; § 77c(b), which allows for offerings of
no more than $5 million; and Regulation S which allows for offers and sales outside the United
States. Securities issued or guaranteed to by federal, state or municipal governments are exempt
as well those issued by not-for profit organizations, those maturing in less than nine months,
those which are part of a reorganization plan under bankruptcy and those which are exchanged
for no associated commission pursuant to an exchange exclusively with existing holders by the
issuer are all exempt according to § 77(c)(a)(10).
35. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77e (LexisNexis through P.L. 111-359 (with a gap of P.L. 111-350)).
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tion, rather than examining the offer itself36 or "substantively regulat-
ing corporate behavior. '37 Depending on the type of issuer, or
transaction, the securities laws require different registration forms and
levels of disclosure.38 Regardless of the issuer or transaction, how-
ever, the issuer must describe its financial condition and operating re-
sults, as well as other matters related to its business.39 Since 1998, the
SEC has enforced a "Plain English" rule that requires financial re-
ports and offering documents to be written in a manner that is clear,
precise and accessible to investors.40
If the registration statement 41 contains any material misstatement
of fact or material omission,42 the purchaser has a cause of action
against the issuer and its directors, the underwriters of the offering,
each person who signed the registration statement, and each expert
(which includes accountants and appraisers) who prepared and con-
sented to be named in the registration statement.43 Such liability pro-
visions are severe and are designed to convey all relevant details to
the markets and investors. However, as will be shown in Part III, such
a disclosure-based approach is not necessarily effective in deterring
the type of behavior that led to the financial crises of the past and that
are likely to lead to potential crises in the future.44
2. Exchange Act
The Exchange Act regulates securities traded in the secondary mar-
ket after initial distribution.45 Under the Exchange Act, issuers with
securities that are either listed on a U.S. national exchange or have
36. EDWARD F. GREENE ET AL., 1 U.S. REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES
AND DERIVATIVES MARKETS, § 1.01 (9th ed. 2009).
37. Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a
More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 143 (2006).
38. See generally Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 12, at 139. The SEC requires different levels
of disclosure based on whether the issuer is a U.S. or non-U.S. issuer. Id.
39. In particular, each registration statement requires a management discussion and analysis
section. See generally GREENE ET AL., supra note 36, § 2-218.
40. See generally SEC RELEASE No. 33-7497, THE PLAIN ENGLISH RELEASE, (Jan. 28, 1998),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/finalU33-7497.txt. See also Andrew T. Serafin, Kicking the
Legalese Habit: The SEC's "Plain English Disclosure" Proposal, 29 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 681 (1998).
41. For further details on the contents of registration statements, see Loss & SELIGMAN, supra
note 12, at 138-44.
42. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77k(a) (LexisNexis through P.L. 111-359 (with a gap of P.L. 111-350)); see
generally Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 12, at 1149-52.
43. Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 12, at 1152. Several statutory provisions grant remedies for
misleading or fraudulent disclosures, including 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77h, 77k, 771(a)(2) and 77q (Lex-
isNexis through P.L. 111-359 (with a gap of P.L. 111-350)). See generally GREENE ET AL., supra
note 36, § 15.03.
44. See infra notes 183-225 and accompanying text.
45. See generally Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 12, at 435.
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500 or more shareholders of any class of equity securities and greater
than $10 million in assets must file periodic reports46 with the SEC.4
7
In addition, issuers who engage in the public offering of debt or equity
securities in the U.S. are required to file periodic reports.48 Recog-
nized as the primary remedy for violations, 49 § 10(b) of the Exchange
Act prohibits the use of any manipulative or deceptive device in inter-
state commerce in the sale or purchase of a security.50 Promulgated
pursuant to § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, Rule 10b-5 makes it unlaw-
ful to use any direct or indirect means of interstate commerce or to
employ any deceptive or manipulative device, or make any material
untrue statement or material omission in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.51
3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Following Enron's spectacular financial meltdown52 and the litany
of other financial scandals that rocked markets around the world at
the dawn of the twenty-first century,5 3 the U.S. Congress engaged in a
feverish attempt5 4 to put into place new legal structures to increase
investor protection.55 The Congressional reform efforts culminated in
46. For its annual report, quarterly report and current report (for any material event or corpo-
rate change), a domestic issuer must file a Form 10-K, Form 10-Q and a Form 8-K, respectively,
while a foreign issuer must file a Form 20-F, which is effective for both the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act, and a Form 8-A is used if the issuer is registering under the Exchange Act in a
public offer. See GREENE ET AL., supra note 36, § 3.03[1].
47. See GREENE ET AL., supra note 36, § 1.03.
48. See generally GREENE ET AL., supra note 36, § 1.03.
49. GREENE ET AL., supra note 36, § 15.03.
50. See generally Loss AND SELIGMAN, supra note 12, at 839-40.
51. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 12, at 962-76. See also
Donald C. Langevoort & G. Mitu Gulati, The Muddled Duty to Disclose Under Rule lOb-5, 57
VAND. L. REV. 1639 (2004) (surveying the case law and discussing different disclosure duties in
various contexts).
52. See generally William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TuL.
L. REV. 1275 (2002); Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of
the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233 (2002); John
C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid, 57 Bus. LAW. 1403
(2002).
53. See generally Scott Green, A Look at the Causes, Impact and Future of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, 3 J. INT'L Bus. & L. 33, 34-46 (2004); John Plender, Problems at Ahold, Parmalat, and Now
Adecco Raise New Questions About How Global Accounting Firms Should Work with Multina-
tionals and the Risks of Modern Investment Management Techniques, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2004, at
15; Tobias Buck, Alarm Spreads as Virus Across the Pond, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2004, at FT
Report: Corporate Governance 2.
54. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Govern-
ance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1523-24 (2005).
55. See Shirinyan, supra note 15, at 524.
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the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 56 ("SOX") in the summer of
2002. SOX is a far-reaching statute,5 7 which imposes significant new
corporate governance, certification, disclosure and other requirements
that directly impact U.S. and non-U.S. 58 companies with securities
listed on national securities exchanges in the U.S. (e.g., the New York
Stock Exchange ("NYSE") and NASDAQ5 9).
SOX is the most significant statute relating to securities regulation
over the past several decades. 60 It created a significant regulatory re-
gime for accountants including independence, certification, and attes-
tation requirements, as well as requiring the establishment of an
accounting oversight board called the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (the "PCAOB"). 61 Furthermore, Title III of SOX
sets forth standards of corporate responsibility, including indepen-
dence standards for audit committees. 62 The increased disclosure 63
and costs 64 associated with SOX have caused much reluctance and
opposition from foreign private issuers65 in particular. 66 Many ex-
perts have harshly criticized Sarbanes-Oxley, 67 arguing that "the cor-
porate governance provisions in SOX are ill conceived. ' 68 Although
SOX imposes significant costs69 on all registered companies and dis-
proportionately affects foreign issuers,70 the additional layers of pro-
56. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7201-66 (LexisNexis through P.L. 111-359 (with a gap of P.L. 111-350)).
57. Stephen C. Gara & Craig J. Langstraat, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A New Ballgame
for Accountants, 34 U. MEM. L. REV. 73, 74-76 (2003).
58. For foreign issuers in particular, SOX has resulted in significant direct and indirect costs to
issuers as well as to their advisers and the exchanges upon which they list. See Shirinyan, supra
note 15, at 525. See also Naidu, supra note 24, at 277.
59. See generally NASDAQ Stock Market - Stock Quotes - Stock Exchange News - NAS-
DAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com (last visited Jan 21, 2011). Operated under the supervision of the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), the NASDAQ Stock Market ("NASDAQ")
is the securities market formerly operating under the name the "National Association Securities
Dealers Automated Quotation System." Securities are quoted on NASDAQ (rather than listed).
60. Gara & Langstraat, supra note 57, at 74.
61. BLUMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 13, §§ 30:5-30:17.
62. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7213 (LexisNexis through P.L. 111-359 (with a gap of P.L. 111-350)).
63. See generally Larry Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Cri-
tique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 16 (2002).
64. See generally Larry Cata Backer, Surveillance and Control: Privatizing and Nationalizing
Corporate Monitoring After Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 MICH ST. L. REV. 327, 338-40 (2004).
65. Rule 405 under the Securities Act and Rule 3b-4 under the Exchange Act define the term
"foreign private issuer." See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.405, 240.3b-4 (2010).
66. See generally Naidu, supra note 24.
67. See generally Romano, supra note 54, at 1521, 1528; see also Ribstein, supra note 63.
68. Romano, supra note 54, at 1528.
69. See generally Ribstein, supra note 63, at 35-45; Romano, supra note 54, at 1588.
70. The SEC received a number of comment letters regarding SOX's impact on foreign issu-
ers. See generally Letter from Todd M. Malan to Jonathan G. Katz (Aug. 19, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72102/tmmalanl.htm (discussing the extremely high level of
liability SOX § 304 could impose on officers of foreign private issuers); Letter from Alexander
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tection offered by SOX cannot ensure ethical behavior,71 and history
indicates that unethical companies simply will become more creative
in thwarting new regulations.72
4. Dodd-Frank Act
On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Act,73
which contains wide provisions for regulating the financial markets.
Among other changes, the Dodd-Frank Act establishes the Financial
Stability Oversight Council, whose purpose is to identify risks to U.S.
financial stability, promote marketplace discipline, and respond to
threats to financial stability.74 In response to criticisms against compa-
nies considered "too big too fail," the Act creates a mechanism
through an "orderly liquidation authority" that allows the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation to take control over financial institutions
whose collapse might threaten the entire U.S. economy.75 The Act
also introduces new regulatory measures related to the hedge fund
and private equity industries as well as adjusts the standards for an
"accredited investor. '76 In addition to creating the Federal Insurance
Office within the Department of the Treasury to monitor most lines of
insurance,77 the Act also introduces stricter regulation, oversight, and
enforcement powers over depository institutions and their subsidiar-
ies. 78 Further, the Dodd-Frank Act assigns primary regulatory re-
sponsibility to the CFTC and the SEC to regulate the swaps market
Schaub to Jonathon G. Katz, (Feb. 18, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s70203/aschaubl.htm (discussing the potential conflicts of law between SOX and laws of the
European Union and the difficulty European issuers may face in complying with both).
71. See generally Ribstein, supra note 63, at 61. With regard to corporate governance, Enron
itself appeared to be a model of good corporate governance before it unravelled. See generally
Ronald B. Davis, Fox in S-OX North, A Question of Fit: The Adoption of United States Market
Solutions in Canada, 33 STETSON L. REV. 955, 968 (2004). Professor Davis points out the limita-
tions of corporate governance: "On the one hand, the board of directors is the only existing
device for monitoring managers. On the other, both more and less sympathetic observers of
boards of directors have come to acknowledge what should have been obvious all along: The
traditional corporate solution of introducing outside directors to bridge the separation between
ownership and control has dramatic limitations." Id. at 970-71 (citing Ronald J. Gilson &
Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director. An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43
STAN. L. REV. 863, 876 (1991)).
72. GREENE ET AL., supra note 36, § 4.02(2).
73. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
74. See id. tit. 1 (Financial Stability).
75. See id. tit. 2 (Orderly Liquidation Authority).
76. See id. tit. 4 (Regulation of Advisers to Hedge Funds and Others).
77. See id. tit. 5 (Insurance).
78. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-203,
124 Stat 1376 (2010), tit. 6 (Improvements to Regulation of Bank and Savings Association Hold-
ing Companies and Depository Institutions).
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and other aspects of the derivative industry.79 The Act also increases
regulation of financial market utilities and institutions engaged in pay-
ment, clearing, and settlement activities80 as well as enhancing regula-
tory requirements relating to broker-dealers, credit rating agencies,
structured finance products, executive compensation and corporate
governance.81 The Act also introduces changes at the Federal Re-
serve, including limiting its authority to engage in emergency lend-
ing,82 and it creates of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection
to issue rules applicable to financial institutions that offer financial
products and services to consumers. 83 Additionally, the Act enables
the Secretary of the Treasury to establish programs aimed at improv-
ing underserved communities' access to financial products 84 and con-
tains amendments to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
of 2009, which was passed in response to the financial crisis precipi-
tated by the failure of the subprime loan industry.8 5 Finally, among its
other provisions, the Act increases disclosure obligation requirements
relating to residential mortgage loans.8 6
5. Other Regulators
The U.S. Congress created the CFTC in 1974 to regulate commod-
ity futures and option markets in the United States. 87 Although its
original mandate largely concerned the agricultural sector, a series of
legislative actions, most notably the Commodity Futures Moderniza-
tion Act of 2000 and most recently the Dodd-Frank Act, has increased
its regulatory authority significantly.88 The CFTC works to encourage
competitiveness and efficiency in the futures markets, to help protect
market participants from manipulation, fraud, and abusive trading
practices, and to ensure the financial integrity of clearing processes.89
Self-regulatory organizations ("SROs") have an important role in
monitoring the capital markets in the United States. These non-gov-
ernmental entities, including the NYSE and the National Association
79. See id. tit. 7 (Wall Street Transparency and Accountability).
80. See id. tit. 8 (Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Supervision).
81. See id. tit. 9 (Investor Protections and Improvements to the Regulation of Securities).
82. See id. tit. 11 (Federal Reserve System Provisions).
83. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-203,
124 Stat 1376 (2010), tit. 10 (Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection).
84. See id. tit. 12 (Improving Access to Mainstream Financial Institutions).
85. See id. tit. 13 (Pay It Back Act).
86. See id. tit. 14 (Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act).
87. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Mission & Responsibilities, CFTC.Gov,
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of Securities Dealers, Inc. ("NASD"), work in concert with the SEC
and act with quasi-governmental authority to adopt rules for the en-
forcement of federal securities laws.90
6. Enforcement and Liability
Enforcement of securities laws in the U.S. is largely posited on
mandatory disclosure and antifraud rules. Sections 77k, 771(a)(2), and
77q(a) of the Securities Act all allow for liability for failure to disclose
all material facts.91 These and other similar provisions "are designed
to work hand-in-hand to protect investors and promote market integ-
rity."'92 In addition, § 78j of the Exchange Act, 93 as well as Rule 10b-
5, further provide for liability for failures to disclose all material
facts.94 The United States Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 was designed to offer protection against frivolous lawsuits.95 The
so-called fraud-on-the-market theory has been the general presump-
tion in U.S. securities litigation since the Supreme Court's decision in
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, which guides shareholder class action suits in
the U.S. and is posited on the efficient market hypothesis, which
broadly assumes that stock values always reflect all relevant informa-
tion and therefore trading prices on exchanges reflect the stock's ac-
tual value.96 A plaintiff may also rely on the common law theory of
deceit, although this is more difficult to prove in practice. 97
90. See generally Ernest E. Badway & Jonathan M. Busch, Ending Securities Industry Self-
Regulation As We Know It, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1351, 1352-56 (2005).
91. In TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), the U.S. Supreme Court ad-
dressed the meaning of the term "material" in the following manner: "An omitted fact is mate-
rial if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important
in deciding how to vote." Id. at 449.
92. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Personal Facts about Executive Officers: A Proposal for Tai-
lored Disclosures to Encourage Reasonable Investor Behavior, 42 WAKE FoREST L. REV. 749,
753 (2007).
93. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j (LexisNexis through P.L. 111-359 (with a gap of P.L. 111-350)).
94. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
95. Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
96. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
97. See Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market Meets Behavioral Finance,
31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 455, 458 (2006). In describing the requirements to prove deceit in reliance
on Greenwald v. Integrated Energy, 103 F.R.D. 65, 68 (S.D. Tex. 1984), the authors note that it
requires "among other things, the following: (1) materiality - whether the misstatement or omis-
sion was important to a reasonable investor; (2) scienter - whether defendants acted with some
degree of intent; (3) reliance - whether the investor's decision to trade was affected by the
omission or misstatement (also sometimes called transaction causation); and (4) loss causation -
whether the misstatement or omission was the proximate cause of the loss to the investor."
Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market Meets Behavioral Finance, 31 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 455, 458 (2006).
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The SEC's Division of Enforcement has the authority to investigate
alleged securities violations, and it may bring an action in federal
court or through an administrative proceeding.98 While the SEC's
statutory purpose is to deter violations and provide remedial relief to
aggrieved investors, its enforcement actions have become punitive
over the past two decades.99 The regulatory measures and penalties
available to the SEC are significant, including an injunction prohibit-
ing the improper conduct, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, civil mone-
tary penalties, a prohibition against a person serving as an officer or
director in a public company, and suspension from practice before the
SEC.100 However, the SEC has no authority to bring a criminal case
against a defendant, but it may recommend that the Department of
Justice prosecute a defendant in a criminal proceeding. 10 1 Although
the U.S. Supreme Court has not determined whether the provision
provides a private cause of action,10 2 the provision grants the SEC
significant power to pursue wrongdoing.
B. The European Union and the United Kingdom
In the context of creating a true internal market, the EU seeks to
eliminate all barriers to the free movement of goods, services, people,
and capital among the EU member states according to the terms of
the Treaties forming the European Union.10 3 The EU has worked to-
ward further integration with the adoption of the Euro as the common
currency among many of its member states, the establishment of the
European Central Bank, and the introduction of European citizen-
ship. Nonetheless, the patchwork of securities regulations in Europe
98. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, About the Division of Enforcement, SEC.Gov,
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/about.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2011).
99. Paul S. Atkins & Bradley J. Bondi, Evaluating the Mission: A Critical Review of the His-
tory and Evolution of the SEC Enforcement Program, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 367, 383
(2008). The authors point out that through Congressional legislation, "the SEC gained three
significant new sets of powers: (1) the ability to seek civil monetary penalties against persons and
entities that may have violated federal securities laws; (2) the authority to bar directors and
officers of public companies from serving in those capacities if they violated federal antifraud
provisions; and (3) the authority to issue administrative cease-and-decease orders, temporary
restraining orders, and orders for disgorgement of ill-gotten profits to violators of federal securi-
ties laws." Id. at 385.
100. Id.
101. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63
VAND. L. REV. 599, 645 (2010).
102. See Herman v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 378 n.2 (1983).
103. For a discussion of the internal market and its development, see John F. Mogg, Regulat-
ing Financial Services in Europe: A New Approach, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 58 (2002).
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"lacks any sort of legal uniformity in terms of laws." 10 4 In an attempt
to identify measures for promoting harmonization among the member
states, the EU Economic and Finance Ministers appointed the Com-
mittee of Wise Men to investigate the regulation of the securities mar-
ket in the EU.10 5 The culmination of the Committee of Wise Men's
work was the recommendation for the creation of the European Se-
curities Committee (the "ESC") and the Committee of European Se-
curities Regulators ("CESR").10 6
Although the U.K. Government has planned fundamental reforms
to financial regulation, 0 7 the principles which have underpinned the
regulatory framework in the U.K. since the late 1990s continue to be
relevant. These principles have focused on the avoidance of duplica-
tion between the roles assigned to the each of the Tri-partite Authori-
ties (Financial Services Authority, Bank of England and Treasury); on
achieving clarity of responsibility and of decision making; and on ade-
quate structural flexibility to respond to an increasingly complex,
global, and integrated financial services market place. The principles
which inform the practice of regulation are a risk-based approach, 0 8
based on a balance between general principles and specific rules. The
following discussion sketches the regulatory framework in the EU, fo-
cusing on the U.K. in particular.
1. European Union
In order to achieve a greater degree of financial markets integra-
tion, the European Commission issued a plan in 1999 to further and
more effectively harmonize EU securities laws with the Financial Ser-
vices Action Plan ("FSAP"), 10 9 which the Lisbon European Council
104. Alexander B. St John, The Regulation of Cross-Border Public Offering of Securities in the
European Union: Present and Future, 29 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 239, 241 (describing the
various directives regulating the capital markets in the European Union).
105. See FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMIrEE OF WISE MEN ON THE REGULATION OF EURO-
PEAN SECURITIES MARKETS, http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/
wisemen/final-report-wise-men en.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2010).
106. See id. at 28. The ESC is comprised of representatives from the member states while
CESR is comprised of senior representatives from the member states' securities regulators.
107. HM TREASURY, A NEW APPROACH TO FINANCIAL REGULATION: JUDGEMENT, Focus
AND STABILITY 4 (2010), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/consultfinancial_
regulation condoc.pdf.
108. Margaret Cole, Director of Enforcement, FSA, Speech at Fordham Law School (Oct. 17,
2006), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uklpages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2006/1017_mc.
shtml.
109. COMMISSION (EC), FINANCIAL SERVICES: IMPLEMENTING THE FRAMEWORK FOR FINAN-
CIAL MARKETS: ACTION PLAN, COM(99)232 (May 11, 1999).
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endorsed in March 2000110 to create the necessary regulatory environ-
ment to help achieve the integration of financial markets in the EU by
2005.111 The FSAP was implemented through a number of legislative
measures regulating or de-regulating financial services, securities mar-
kets, and corporate governance.112 A number of European directives
form the securities regulatory framework, including the Prospectus
Directive, 113 the Takeover Directive, 114 the Transparency Directive,11 5
the Market Abuse Directive,'1 6 and the Markets in Financial Instru-
ments Directive.11 7
a. Prospectus Directive
As part of its effort to create a true pan-European securities regime
and enhance consumer protection, the European Commission
adopted the Prospectus Directive in December 2003, and the imple-
mentation of the directive in the national laws or regulations was to
occur no later than July 1, 2005.118 The Directive specifies the disclo-
sure requirements relating to initial information for securities offered
110. HM TREASURY ET AL, THE EU FINANCIAL SERVICES ACTION PLAN: A GUIDE 6 (July 31,
2003), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/fsapguide.pdf.
111. Financial Services: Latest Report Highlights Need to Boost EU Capital Market Integra-
tion in Next Nine Months, IP/03/778 (June 2, 2003).
112. See Luca Enriques & Matteo Gatti, Is There a Uniform EU Securities Law After the
Financial Services Action Plan?, 14 STAN J.L. BUS. & FIN. 43, 44-45 (2008).
113. Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council (EC) No. 2003/71 of 4 Novem-
ber 2003, 2003 O.J. 344/64 (prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public
or admitted to trading and amending Directive No. 2001/34 (2003) O.J. 345/64 (Prospectus
Directive)).
114. Directive 2004/25, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 Apr. 2004, 2004
O.J. (L 142) 12.
115. Directive 2004/109, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 Dec. 2004, 2004
O.J. (L 390) 38. (harmonization of transparency requirements in relation to information about
issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market, and amending Directive
No. 2001/34/EC, O.J. 390/38 (Transparency Directive)).
116. Directive 2003/6, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 Jan. 2003, 2003
O.J. (L 96) 16 (insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse)).
117. Directive 2004/39, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 Apr. 2004, 2004
O.J. (L 145) 1 (markets in financial instruments). For implementation of the Directive in the
U.K. see Policy Document, FSA Implementing the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
(MiFID), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/ps07 02.pdf.
118. See HM TREASURY ET AL., THE EU FINANCIAL SERVICES AcIoN PLAN: DELIVERING
THE FSAP IN THE UK 3-7 (2004), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/lB4C6967-
BCDC-D4B3-124E99B62E501FCD.pdf; Directive 2003/71, of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 4 November 2003 on the Prospectus to be Published When Securities are Offered
to the Public or Admitted to Trading and Amending Directive 2001/34/EC, 2001 OJ. (L 345) 64,
81 (indicating that the implementation deadline is July 1, 2005).
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publicly or admitted to trading on a EU regulated market. 119 As the
Prospectus Directive is a "maximum harmonization" directive, the
member states are not able to impose additional requirements regard-
ing the content of a prospectus or the circumstances requiring a pro-
spectus on issuers from other member states.120 The importance of
the Prospectus Directive is that it provides a single platform for issu-
ers to raise capital in the EU, and has created a far more harmonized
European regime across the member states.121
b. Takeover Directive
The Takeover Directive establishes a common EU framework to
regulate takeover bids of companies whose securities trade on EU
regulated markets.122 The Directive is modelled closely on the U.K.
Takeover Code, which is strongly weighted toward protecting the
shareholders' interests.1 23 However, member states have imple-
mented the Takeover Directive in different manners. These various
national approaches have hindered the development of a transparent
and stable cross-border restructuring environment.1 24
c. Transparency Directive
The Transparency Directive covers the content and regularity with
which companies should report financial information, and ensures that
such information is appropriately disseminated to the market. 25 The
Transparency Directive requires member states to take measures to
119. See Jorge de Pereira & S6nia Teixeira da Mota, The Pros and Cons of the Prospectus
Directive, 24 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 79 (2005). The Prospectus Directive should be put in action by
all EU Member states by July 1, 2005. Id. at 79.
120. See CESR, CESR's REPORT ON THE SUPERVISORY FUNCTIONING OF THE PROSPECTUS
DIRECTIVE AND REGULATION 5 (June 2007); Edward F. Greene, Resolving Regulatory Conflicts
Between the Capital Markets of the United States and Europe, 2 CAPITAL MARKETS L.J. 5, 16
(2007).
121. CENTRE FOR STRATEGY & EVALUATION SERVICES, STUDY ON THE IMPACT OF THE PRO-
SPECTUS REGIME ON EU FINANCIAL MARKETS 7 (June 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
internalmarket/securities/docs/prospectus/cses-report en.pdf.
122. Directive 2004/25, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 Apr. 2004, 2004
O.J. (L 142) 12.
123. See John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and
Why? - The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. L.J. 1727,1729
(2007).
124. See generally Matteo Gatti, Optionality Arrangements and Reciprocity in the European
Takeover Directive, 6 EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REV. 553 (2005).
125. Directive 2004/109, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004
on the Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in Relation to Information About Issuers
Whose Securities are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market and Amending Directive
2001/34/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 390) 38.
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comply with the directive by January 20, 2007.126 In contrast to the
Prospectus Directive, the Transparency Directive is not a "maximum
harmonization" directive; therefore, the member states are able to im-
pose additional requirements on issuers incorporated in their respec-
tive countries. 127 The Transparency Directive requires issuers of debt
or equity securities traded on a stock market or other regulated mar-
ket in the EU to publish within four months of the end of the financial
year, file with the appropriate authority with the issuer's home mem-
ber state, and make publicly available in the EU an audited financial
statement under the International Financial Reporting Standards or
its equivalent, and a management report and statements made by the
persons responsible within the issuer.128 Similarly, the Transparency
Directive requires companies to issue half-year reports using interna-
tional accounting standards within two months of the issuer's financial
half-year, and be accompanied by a management report and state-
ments made by the persons responsible within the issuer. 129 Irrespec-
tive of whether the issuers report quarterly because they are required
to by their national legislation or by the rules of the regulated market
or by its own initiative, they are required to make an interim state-
ment explaining material events and transactions that occurred during
the period and its impact on the financial position of the issuer and a
general description of its financial position and performance. 130 The
Transparency Directive further requires the disclosure of significant
changes in securities holdings as measured by voting rights beginning
with five percent and thereafter at each five percent interval to thirty
percent, then at fifty percent and finally at seventy-five percent.131
d. Market Abuse Directive
Effective April 2003, the Market Abuse Directive sets forth regula-
tions to address insider trading and market manipulation, affecting all
firms and individuals participating in a regulated market in the EU.132
The primary requirements for firms are mandatory suspicious transac-
tion reporting and preventative requirements for issuers and their ad-
126. Id. at 56.
127. Id. at 42.
128. Id. at 44-45.
129. Id. at 45.
130. Directive 2004/109, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004
on the Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in Relation to Information About Issuers
Whose Securities are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market and Amending Directive
2001/34/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 390) 38, 46.
131. Id. at 47.
132. Directive 2003/6, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on
Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse), 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16.
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visers to keep lists of staff who have inside information. 133 The
Market Abuse Directive requires the dissemination of inside informa-
tion as soon as possible in order to avoid market abuse.134 The Mar-
ket Abuse Directive adopts a uniform definition of "inside
information" where information must be of a precise nature, be price
sensitive, not have been made public, and related to issuer(s) of finan-
cial instruments or of related derivative financial instruments. 135
e. Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), which
came into force in April 2004, replaces the existing Investment Ser-
vices Directive and regulates the authorization and conduct of securi-
ties firms and markets. 136 The purpose of MiFID is to promote the
cross-EU provision of investment services while protecting the inves-
tor and supporting market integrity. 37
2. United Kingdom
a. The Financial Services Authority
The Financial Services Authority (the "FSA") is the single statutory
regulator for financial services in the UK, 138 which was formed from
the merger of nine sector-based regulatory bodies.139 The reasoning
for an integrated financial services regulator is indicative of market
developments: for example, the increase in the number of financial
corporations and the blurring of boundaries between financial prod-
133. Id. at 22.
134. Id. at 17.
135. Id. at 20.
136. Directive 2004/39, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on
Markets in Financial Instruments, amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and
Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council
Directive 93/22/EEC, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1.
137. FSA, CURRENT EU ISSUES IN FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATION (2005), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/about/media/notesbnO11.shtml.
138. CLIVE BRIAULT, THE RATIONALE FOR A SINGLE NATIONAL FINANCIAL SERVICES REGU-
LATOR 5, FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY OCCASIONAL PAPERS SERIES (1999), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/pl5.pdf.
139. The previous regulatory bodies consisted of the following: The Securities and Investment
Board, the Personal Investment Authority, the Investment Management Regulatory Organisa-
tion, the Securities and Futures Authority, the Supervision and Surveillance Division of the
Bank of England, the Building Societies Commission, the Insurance Directorate of the Depart-
ment of Trade and Industry, the Friendly Societies Commission and, the Registrar of Friendly
Societies.
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ucts which make sector-based regulation less viable. 140 The Memo-
randum of Understanding ("MOU") importantly sets out the role of
each principal authority of the tripartite oversight framework for fi-
nancial stability, a responsibility collectively shared between the Bank
of England, the FSA and the Treasury. 141 The MOU includes a re-
vised description of the role and function of each of the three groups.
The Bank of England is to continue to add to the maintenance of the
stability of the financial system as a whole based on its macro-eco-
nomic and financial analysis and its operational involvement in the
markets, payment systems, and market infrastructure. 142 The FSA has
responsibilities for the authorization and supervision of financial insti-
tutions, supervision of financial markets, securities clearing and settle-
ment systems, and for relevant regulatory policy. 143 The Treasury is
responsible for the overall institutional structure of regulation and the
legislation governing it, including the negotiations of EC directives. 144
It has been argued that the UK's principle-based approach has been
seen as an attractive model compared to more stringent regulatory
requirements. 145
The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 sets out four statutory
regulatory objectives and several regulatory principles, 146 including
maintaining market confidence in the financial system, promoting
public awareness of the financial system, securing consumer protec-
tion, and preventing the financial sector firms from being used for a
purpose connected with financial crime. 147 In fulfilling these objec-
tives, the FSA is guided by a number of particular considerations, in-
cluding: the efficient and economic use of resources; financial services
firms' management role in meeting regulatory responsibilities; the
principle that a burden or restriction on regulated activity should be
140. CLIVE BRIAULT, REVISITING THE RATIONALE FOR A SINGLE NATIONAL FINANCIAL SER-
VICES REGULATOR 6, FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY OCCASIONAL PAPERS SERIES (2002),
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/occpapers/op16.pdf.
141. See BANK OF ENGLAND ET AL., MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN HM





145. U.N. Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and its Impact on Devel-
opment, Report of the Commission of Experts of the President of the United Nations General
Assembly on the Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System 44-45 (June 24-26,
2009), available at http://www.un.org/ga/president/63/interactive/financialcrisis/Preliminary
Report210509.pdf.
146. BRIAULT, supra note 138, at 8; FSA, PRINCIPLES-BASED REGULATION: FOCUSING ON THE
OUTCOMES THAT MATTER (2007), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/principles.pdf.
147. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 2(2) (U.K.).
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proportionate to the benefit conferred; the facilitation of innovation
in the market; and maintenance of the U.K.'s competitive position.148
b. The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000
Consolidating the previous main legislative regimes governing the
marketing of deposits, insurance, and investments, 149 the Financial
Services and Markets Act 2000 ("FSMA") came into force on Novem-
ber 30, 2001, and provides a single flexible legislative framework, con-
ferring extensive powers on the Treasury and the FSA to devise the
details of the regulatory regime by secondary legislation. 150 Part II of
the Act sets forth the "general prohibition" such that only an author-
ized or an exempt person may carry on, or may purport to carry on, a
regulated activity from the U.K. 151 Under the FSMA, the FSA may
impose disciplinary sanctions, including fines or public statements, for
breaches of the Listing Rules.152
3. The Bank of England, the Treasury, and Future Reforms
The Bank of England has an independent role in setting monetary
policies. Its role exists in the area of macroeconomic stability,
whereas the two microeconomic stability objectives of prudential su-
pervision and investor protection are within the FSA's regulatory re-
gime. 153 The Treasury has reserve powers to give orders to the
Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank if they are required in the
public interest and by extreme economic circumstances, but such or-
ders must be endorsed by Parliament. 154
Chancellor George Osborne is convinced that the tripartite system
of regulation set up in 1997, which split the control of the Bank, the
Treasury, and the FSA, has been a contributory factor in the financial
148. See FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, MEETING OUR RESPONSIBILITIES 19 (Aug. 1998),
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/P05.pdf. The FSA is fully committed to an open
and responsive approach, for example, allowing the establishment of a practitioner forum whose
function is to monitor the extent to which the authority is meeting its statutory objectives. Id. at
9.
149. See generally The Insurance Companies Act 1987 (U.K.); The Financial Services Act
1986 (U.K.); and the Banking Act 1987 (U.K.).
150. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 2(4) (U.K.).
151. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 19 (U.K.).
152. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, §§ 85, 90, 91 (U.K.).
153. Giorgio Di Giorgio & Carmine Di Noia, Financial Market Regulation and Supervision:
How Many Peaks for the Euro Area?, 28 BROOK. J. Irr'L L. 463, 485 (2003).
154. Bank of England Act 1998, Part II, § 19 (U.K.).
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crisis problems in U.K. 155 Since the formation of FSA in 1997 until
2010, the UK has presented a unified supervisory system with the FSA
acting as a single supervisory agent, given statutory powers by the Fi-
nancial Services and Markets Act 2000.156 However, the tripartite re-
lationship of the three authorities has been highly criticised since the
failure of Northern Rock in 2007.157 The new coalition Conservative-
Liberal Democrat Government has pronounced the single regulatory
model as dated. This initiative will involve the cessation of the FSA in
its current form,158 and greater power for the Bank of England with
the formation of a new Financial Policy Committee 159 within the Bank
to take responsibility of the macro- prudential regulation' 60 and a new
Prudential Regulatory Authority ("PRA") as a subsisidiary of the
Bank to take responsibility of the micro-prudential regulation.' 61 In
addition, a new Consumer Protection and Markets Authority
("CPMA") will be formed with responsibility of the conduct of busi-
ness and markets regulation. 62 This supervisory and regulatory over-
haul is expected to be completed in 2012 and the FSA will be split into
CPMA and the PRA.163 A consultation will commence to consider
whether to transfer responsibility for prosecuting criminal offences in-
volving insider dealing, market abuse, and other criminal law breaches
to a new Economic Crime Agency. 164
4. Liability and Enforcement of U.K. and EU Law
With its power to initiate financial sector regulation, the European
Commission plays a fundamental role in the formulation and monitor-
ing of financial regulation in the EU. From 1999 to 2005, the Financial
Services Action plan guided the European Commission's initiatives,
and since 2005, the White Paper on Financial Services has set the
155. See Jill Treanor & Larry Elliott, George Osborne to Strip FSA of City Regulation Powers,
GUARDIAN, June 3, 2010, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/jun/O3/george-
osborne-fsa-city-bank?INTCMP=SRCH.
156. FSA, Who Are We?, FSA.GOV.UK, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/AboutWho/index.shtml
(last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
157. FSA, THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRI-
sis 88 (2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner-review.pdf.
158. HM Treasury, Financial Services, HM-TREASURY.GOV.UK, http://www.hm-treasury.gov.
uk/reformand-regulation.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
159. HM TREASURY, supra note 107, at 4.
160. HM TREASURY, supra note 107, at 4.
161. HM TREASURY, supra note 107, at 4.
162. HM TREASURY, supra note 107, at 4.
163. Written Evidence Submitted by the FSA, PARLIAMENT.UK (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.
publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm21ll/cmselect/cmtreasy/memo/financialreg/m27.htm.
164. HM TREASURY, supra note 107, at 45.
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objectives,'165 including soundly enforcing current rules, eliminating in-
consistencies in regulation, and enhancing convergence among regula-
tory supervisors, promoting competition, and increasing the EU's
influence on global capital markets.166 The EU's financial regulation
is designed to support the single market in financial services.167
Named after Alexander Lamfalussy, the Lamfalussy framework en-
dorsed by the European Council in 2001 provides a four-level ap-
proach for the adoption of EU financial regulation. The first two
levels relate to the creation of regulation, with level one denoting the
adoption of legislation and level two referring to technical rulemaking
led by the European Commission for the implementation of level one
legislation. Level three concerns the activities of the Committee of
European Banking Supervisors ("CEBS"), the Committee of Euro-
pean Securities Regulators ("CESR"), and the Committee of Euro-
pean Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors ("CEIOPS")
to encourage supervisory convergence and best practices. Level four
denotes regulatory enforcement, chiefly by national supervisory au-
thorities, although the European Commission monitors the applica-
tion of legislation while the European Court of Justice hears
allegations of infringements. 168 Because of the complicated four-level
approach to financial regulation, the enforcement of liability stan-
dards for infringement of financial regulation varies across the mem-
ber states of the EU. 169
In the U.K., shareholders can potentially sue directors both under
the FSMA and the common law to recover losses caused by false or
misleading disclosure in documents supporting a public offering of
165. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, WHITE PAPER ON FINANCIAL SER-
VICES POLICY 2005-2010 (Dec. 1, 2005), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/
com/2005/com2005_0629en01.pdf.
166. MYRIAM VANDER STICHELE, FINANCIAL REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: MAP-
PING EU DECISION MAKING STRUCTURES ON FINANCIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 13
(2008), available at http://www.eurodad.org/uploadedFiles/WhatsNew/Reports/EUMapping-
FinancialRegulationFINAL.pdf.
167. See WHITE PAPER ON FINANCIAL SERVICES POLICY (2005-2010), available at http://
europa.eu/legislation-summaries/internal-market/single-market-services/financial-services-
general-framework/133225_en.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
168. The future of EU financial regulation and supervision, Chapter 2: Regulation And Super-
vision In The European Union, UK PARLIAMENT, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
ld200809/ldselect/ldeucom/106/10605.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2011).
169. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Eu-
ropean Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Reinforcing Sanc-
tioning Regimes in the Financial Services Sector 6-8 (2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
internalmarket/consultations/docs/2010/sanctions/COM_2010_0716_en.pdf.
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shares.170 Shareholders in a public company can potentially sue in
their own name under U.K. securities law to recover losses caused by
false or misleading corporate disclosures. 171 Under S459 of the Com-
panies Act 1985, the risks posed to non-executive directors are negligi-
ble due to the fact that the U.K. lacks an analogue to SEC Rule 10b-
5.172 Theoretically, any negligent misstatements in the annual ac-
counts and other documents disseminated by U.K. directors can be
the base for a suit by investors; however, this is only successful in rare
events that the information provided guides a specific purchase or sale
of shares.173
Directors of UK public companies can be held liable to sharehold-
ers for listing particulars that fail to include required material or that
contain false or misleading disclosures. Any person who has suffered
a loss due to false or misleading statements or omissions from listing
particulars may be given compensation by the responsible person. 174
However, as of 2006, no claims had been brought forward under sec-
tion 90 of FMSA 2000.175 This claim is analogous to a U.S. claim
under § 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 for a material misstatement in
a prospectus.
The FSA's supervision and enforcement powers use individual re-
sponsibility and accountability as a core feature, with senior manage-
ment responsibility a fundamental feature of the regulatory regime
introduced by the FSMA.176 Under the FSMA, authorized firms must
ensure that individuals who carry out so-called "controlled functions"
(certain key functions carried on in relation to regulatory activities
specified in section 59 of the FSMA) obtain approval from the FSA
before performing such functions. 177 After coming under much criti-
cism following the onset of the financial crisis, the FSA is keen to
assert an overtly strong regulatory approach. 78
170. PAUL DAVIES, DAVIES REVIEW OF ISSUER LIABILITY: LIABILITY FOR MISSTATEMENTS
TO THE MARKETS 17 (2007).
171. PALMER'S COMPANY LAW 8.809 (G.K. Morse ed., 2001).
172. Brian Cheffins & Bernard Black, Outside Director Liability Across Countries 1411, EUR.
CORP. GOVERNANCE INST., LAW WORKING PAPER No. 71/2006, available at http://ssm.com/
abstract=438321.
173. See GORE-BROWNE ON COMPANIES 43.27 (Alistair Alcock ed., 50th ed. 2004).
174. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 90 (U.K.).
175. Brian R. Cheffins & Bernard S. Black, Outside Director Liability Across Countries, 84
TEX. L. REV. 1385, 1411 (2006).
176. HM TREASURY, REFORMING FINANCIAL MARKETS 35-38 (2009).
177. See Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 59 (U.K.).
178. See generally FSA, THE FSA's MARKETS REGULATORY AGENDA (2010), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/markets.pdf.
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III. ANALYSIS
Both the U.S. and the EU have largely adopted disclosure as the
model underpinning securities regulation.179 The current regulatory
approach to financial regulation has failed to deter harmful behavior
that has resulted in an unprecedented loss of value to shareholders as
well as enormous liabilities to taxpayers. The current financial crisis is
the most severe since the Great Depression.180 There has been no
shortage of new ideas to reform the financial system, although current
efforts have largely focused on the symptoms of the excess, such as
executive pay and bonuses, calling for further disclosure and caps on
incentive-based compensation."8 However, disclosure-based regula-
tory safeguards have failed to protect investors from the risks of actors
in the financial industry seeking short-term gains at the expense of the
public, and an ever-growing body of research points out the weak-
nesses of disclosure regimes.' 82 Without a fundamentally different ap-
proach to regulation, the current disclosure-based regulatory model
offers little hope of deterring the next major crisis.
The following discussion will examine the inherent weaknesses of
the current disclosure-based financial regulatory system endorsed by
the U.S. and EU (with particular attention paid to the U.K.) and the
challenges of transnational regulatory cooperation in financial regula-
tion. The discussion will critically analyze the current culture of risk-
taking in the financial sector, which has had a detrimental impact on
the public. Thereafter, this article will suggest alternatives for modify-
ing behavior in lieu of additional disclosure-based rules as a means to
deter excessively risky behavior by financial institutions.
179. See Chiu, supra note 8, at 739.
180. In August 2009, the International Monetary Fund estimated the cost of the financial crisis
to be approximately $11.9 trillion. See Edmund Conway, IMF puts total cost of crisis at £7.1
trillion, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Aug. 8, 2009. According to the news agency Reuters, market par-
ticipants have estimated that 40-45% of the world's wealth has been destroyed in the crisis. See
Megan Davies and Walden Siew, 45 percent of world's wealth destroyed: Blackstone CEO,
REUTERS, March 10, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE52966Z20090311
(last visited Oct. 2, 2010).
181. The bonus system at large banks encourages individuals to seek short-term profits, which
allows "members of the investment industry profit in good times but not share the losses in bad
times and encourages unchecked risk taking." See Aaron Unterman, Innovative Destruction -
Structured Finance and Credit Market Reform in the Bubble Era, 5 HASTNGs Bus. L.J. 53, 86
(2009).
182. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law
from Behavioral Economics about Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CALIF. L. REV.
627 (1996); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1023 (2000); Matthew A. Edwards, Empirical and Behavioral Critiques of Mandatory Dis-
closure: Socio-Economics and the Quest for Truth in Lending, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'Y
199 (2005).
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A. Weaknesses of Disclosure
A cornerstone assumption of regulatory models based on disclosure
is the rationality of market participants. Accordingly, a mandatory
disclosure scheme can work most effectively where investors, analysts,
brokers, and other actors have access to enough information, are able
to process the information sufficiently, and behave in a rational man-
ner.183 Much of the current reliance on disclosure-based financial reg-
ulation is based on tacit acceptance of the efficient-market
hypothesis, 184 and assumes rationality in the financial markets and
that "the independent judgments of buyers and sellers in a securities
market will best determine accurate prices for securities if those buy-
ers and sellers have adequate information. '' 185 However, the basic as-
sumption of rationality may actually be flawed, which raises
significant concerns with respect to investor protection.
Studies in behavioral finance have "documented aspects of 'irra-
tionality' in investors' behavior and explored the implications of these
deviations from rationality on financial markets."'186 The notion that
investors always operate rationally is refuted by research on cognitive
constraints and biases, 18 7 as well as the cycle of the growth of bubbles
in the financial markets.1 88 While a detailed discussion is beyond the
scope of this article, research has shown that decision-makers rou-
tinely suffer from "information overload" and exhibit "herd behavior"
by following the actions of others rather than displaying a rational
approach to decisions. 189 Studies on rationality further suggest that
decisions are the result of a host of factors and circumstances, and
investors are often confronted with more information than they can
183. See generally Bradford Cornell & James C. Rutten, Market Efficiency, Crashes, and Se-
curities Litigation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 443, 443-47 (2006) (discussing the endorsement of the effi-
cient market hypothesis by the U.S. courts).
184. For a summary of the research on the efficient capital markets hypothesis, see Dunbar &
Heller, supra note 97, at 462-65 (2006).
185. Paula J. Dailey, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory System, 34 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 1089, 1094 (2007).
186. Dunbar & Heller, supra note 97, at 471 (2006).
187. See generally Ripken, supra note 37, at 146 (citing Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477 (1998); Donald C. Langevoort,
Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Re-
view, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1503-06 (1998).
188. See generally Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of
Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 393 (2006) (discussing the cycle of growth and decay in
the financial markets).
189. See generally Dailey, supra note 185, at 1114-15 (reviewing and summarizing research on
the ability of individuals to correctly process information).
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actually process.190 With too much information to digest and too little
time to process it, "information overload can result in confusion, cog-
nitive strain, and poorer decision-making." 191 Additionally, the im-
pact of financial disclosure on investors can lead to "irrational
exuberance and anxiety," and "[i]t is well-recognized that investors
can suffer cognitively from.., being unable to cognitively process and
understand too much information."'1 92 Therefore, "one of the most
significant problems with relying on a disclosure-based system to pro-
tect securities markets and investors is the flawed assumption that in-
vestors are purely rational actors who can utilize the disclosure
effectively to make optimal investment decisions."'1 93
Whether as a result of complexity, fraud, or confusion, both analysts
and investors routinely misjudge the actual value of securities. Studies
by behavioral finance theorists have also demonstrated that the prices
of securities are often mispriced.194 With respect to analysts, a grow-
ing body of research suggests that hypermotivated and super-optimis-
tic insiders in firms may act irrationally in underestimating risks by
"emphasizing positive returns as an indication of ability and down-
playing trading losses as irrelevant.' '195 Likewise, investors may ex-
hibit "judgment biases that lead them to underestimate the risk that
bad things will occur."'1 96 Furthermore, the proliferation of informa-
tion in the age of the Internet where many investors rely less on ex-
perts to filter complex financial information may result in investors
actually suffering from the requirements of securities regimes based
on disclosure.197 As one expert notes, "[m]ore information alone can-
not cure investors of the judgment biases that supposedly lead them to
misuse the information."'1 98 Given all these contradictions to the as-
sumptions underlying the efficient market theory, it is doubtful that
disclosure in itself can adequately protect investors.
190. Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for
Securities Regulation, 2003 WASH. U. L. Q. 417, 418-19 (2003).
191. Ripken, supra note 37, at 160.
192. Peter H. Huang, How Do Securities Laws Influence Affect, Happiness, & Trust, 3 J. Bus.
TECH. L. 257, 291 (2008).
193. Ripken, supra note 37, at 147-48.
194. See generally ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 179-80 (2000). So-called
"noise traders" - those who purchase and sell securities based on tips, reports of the media,
misinterpretation of data and other reasons that do not reflect economic fundamentals - have
been shown to explain irrational changes in the price of securities. See generally Cornell &
Rutten, supra note 183, at 464.
195. Ribstein, supra note 63, at 20.
196. Ribstein, supra note 63, at 22.
197. Dalley, supra note 185, at 1090.
198. Ribstein, supra note 63, at 23.
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Moreover, a disclosure-based regime can allow market participants
to conceal investment risks behind opaque complex financial instru-
ments that neither sophisticated nor retail investors actually under-
stand.199 Many experts blame the subprime mortgage crisis on the
complexity in the financial markets along with a "lack of trans-
parency" that caused even sophisticated investors to make poor in-
vestments, while "[f]inancial institutions overestimated their ability to
disseminate values and comprehend risk. ' '2°° The complexity of prod-
ucts in connection with the subprime mortgage industry illustrates the
difficulty in relying on disclosure as a means to regulate financial in-
struments, especially with respect to derivative instruments which are
largely unregulated. 20' With respect to some collateral debt obliga-
tions ("CDO"), for example, no amount of disclosure can adequately
convey associated risks since investment banks "can tweak the inputs,
assumptions, and underlying assets to produce a CDO that appears to
add value, even though in reality it does not. '20 2 Likewise, the corpo-
rate fraud crises of 2002 was perpetuated by structuring transactions
which complied with disclosure obligations while companies such as
Enron and WorldCom "pursued a single-minded policy of boosting
the company's stock price at all costs. '20 3 Accordingly, Enron was
able to evade disclosure requirements with the help of "[u]niversal
banks [which] orchestrated a myriad of complex transactions" that en-
abled Enron to conceal approximately $25 billion in debt
obligations.20 4
Beyond the issue of complexity, financial institutions routinely ex-
ploit areas of regulatory lacunae as well as take advantage of exemp-
tions from regulation.2 05 In particular, certain types of transactions
such as those involving sophisticated investors and specific areas in-
cluding derivatives and hedge funds are largely unregulated by either
199. The opaqueness of such financial instruments raises ethical issues with respect to the duty
of financial institutions to market instruments which the creators of such instruments do not fully
understand or judge to be sound investments.
200. See Unterman, supra note 181, at 72.
201. Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1036 (2007).
202. Id. at 1044.
203. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates
and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 998 (2009).
204. Id. at 999.
205. In 2008, private placements made pursuant to U.S. exemptions including Rule 144A,
Regulation S, and Private Investment in Public Equity (PIPE) transactions amounted to $117.6
billion. See Jennifer J. Johnston, Private Placements: A Regulatory Black Hole, 35 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 151, 176 n.151 (2010) (citing Sagient Research Systems, Inc., Placement Tracker Private Place-
ment Resources, http://www.sagientresearch.com/pt/Stats.cfm?Type9).
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national or international rules.20 6 With respect to derivatives, in par-
ticular, the International Swaps and Derivative Association (ISDA)20 7
"has actively resisted disclosure of credit default swap documentation,
insisting that this information is proprietary. '208 Accordingly, market
practices evolve with little or no guidance from financial regulators.20 9
While the Dodd-Frank Act in the U.S. grants authority to the CFTC
and SEC to oversee the derivative industry, many of the key terms in
the legislation are undefined. 210 The subprime mortgage crisis that
began in 2007 largely evolved from such a regulatory void, with finan-
cial institutions and other actors in the private sectors devising ever
more exotic securitized instruments and off-balance sheet arrange-
ments. To the extent that a regime of disclosure is incapable of offer-
ing adequate protection to investors, other measures to curtail
unreasonably risky behavior by financial institutions could go a long
way to protecting investors.
While disclosure regimes require companies and financial institu-
tions to provide all material information, the offeror of securities has
significant discretion in determining which details it deems mate-
rial. 211 Further, in the context of private placements which are ef-
fected pursuant to exemptions from disclosure requirements,212 it is
unclear as to how the stakeholders in the purchasing entities are pro-
tected from overly risky investment decisions. Since many complex
financial instruments are issued via private placements, a regime of
disclosure will not adequately protect investors. 213 Investors in resi-
dential mortgage-backed securities ("RMBS"), the instruments that
played a key role in the subprime mortgage crisis, "had very limited
206. See generally Unterman, supra note 181.
207. ISDA - International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc., http://www.isda.org/ (last
visited February 2, 2011).
208. Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 201, at 1036.
209. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that certain transactions involving so-
phisticated investors do not require the protection afforded by the federal securities laws as they
are able to "fend for themselves." SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
210. See Title VII: Wall Street Transparency and Accountability, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4173 (2010).
211. See generally Janis Sarra, Disclosure as a Public Policy Instrument in Global Capital Mar-
kets, 42 TEX. INT'L L.J. 875, 888-95 (2007) (discussing various national regulatory approaches for
materiality and management's determination of whether information is material).
212. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77d(2) (LexisNexis through P.L. 111-359 (with a gap of P.L. 111-350))
(exempting "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering").
213. The market for private placements is significant. In terms of equity offers alone, $162
billion was raised via Rule 144A equity offerings, which was more than the combined capital
raised in IPOs on the New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ and the American Stock Exchange
in 2006. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Birth of Rule 144A Equity Offerings, 56 UCLA L.
REV. 409, 412 (2008).
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opportunit[y] to perform their own due diligence" 214 and instead re-
lied on the underwriters from which they purchased the RMBS, who
"frequently cut costs and boosted profits by doing minimal due dili-
gence of their own. '215 The justification is that investors in private
placements meet certain tests relating to size and financial sophistica-
tion. Yet, these investors manage the holdings of smaller and less so-
phisticated investors, the very individuals the securities laws were
designed to protect. For example, ten times as much equity was raised
by foreign companies in the private U.S. markets than in the public
U.S. markets in 2005.216 In the context of derivates, not only is infor-
mation on the instruments opaque, but the manner in which instru-
ments are structured can make it difficult, if not impossible, to assess
the associated risks.217
Most regulators have detailed requirements for disclosure. In the
U.S., the SEC specifies particular items in its various forms, and the
EU Prospectus Directive contains similar corresponding disclosure re-
quirements. 218 Nonetheless, these requirements do not necessarily
capture the dynamic processes and personalities that lead to decisions
in the boardroom since "information a firm's managers use to under-
stand a company's operations varies from manager to manager and
from company to company. '219 Much of the information companies
disclose in periodic reports and offering documents is only included if
management deems it "material. '220 For example, decisions to in-
clude personal details under gap-filling and antifraud rules relating to
non-corporate information are particularly sensitive, and "materiality
determinations are perhaps the most tricky."' 221 With respect to the
214. Wilmarth, supra note 203, at 1026.
215. Wilmarth, supra note 203, at 1026.
216. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 229, 234 n.10 (2007) (citing COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, INTERIM
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 2-6 (2006), available at http://
crapo.senate.gov/documents/committee-Capmarkets-reg.pdf).
217. See generally Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 201, at 1036.
218. Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November
2003 on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to
trading and amending Directive 2001/34/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 64.
219. Michael D. Guttentag, An Argument for Imposing Disclosure Requirements on Public
Companies, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 123, 171 (2004).
220. See GREENE ET AL., supra note 36, at § 3.03[1].
221. Heminway, supra note 92, at 766. Heminway points out that:
executives must make these decisions in what may be highly stressful or emotionally
charged situations (e.g., under threat of criminal prosecution or civil enforcement, in
the wake of a medical diagnosis of a serious or terminal illness, at a time of financial
strife, or during the course of a divorce or nonpublic marital affair) [and] ... decision
making in times of stress, especially on matters involving a high level of sophistication
and focus, has a low probability of being accurate, rational or optimal.
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EU in particular, the creation of a single market lacks a consistent set
of rules to establish an efficient single market for securities. The di-
versity caused by the various national rules and regulations can lead to
competitive distortions among the financial institutions and encourage
regulatory arbitrage. 222
For the reasons discussed above, the current regulatory approach
based on disclosure has proved to have significant defects in terms of
protecting investors. The complexity of disclosure in public offerings
raises questions as to whether any level of disclosure can adequately
convey the risks of certain financial instruments,223 and it is doubtful
that disclosure is even capable of conveying useful information in cer-
tain contexts. In his analysis of disclosure, Professor Steven Schwarcz
has pointed out that certain transactions are so complicated that "few
if any investors will actually understand the detailed disclosure. '224 In
fact, disclosure requirements can actually be counterproductive, as
they "may produce a wealth of complicated but ultimately unimpor-
tant information. ' 225 Both the regulatory systems of the U.S. and the
EU face severe challenges in protecting investors and the financial
markets under the current disclosure-based systems.
B. Alternatives to Disclosure: International Regulatory Cooperation
to Deter Overly Risky Behavior
Beyond the inherent flaws of disclosure, the interconnectedness of
the financial system and the widespread impact gaps in national regu-
lation can have in the global economy necessitate a new approach to
discouraging risky behavior. The patchwork of national financial reg-
ulators that constitute the current "national approach to securities
regulation" allows for "large gaps between domestic regimes which
provide ample opportunity for firms to adopt marginal practices in
pursuit of profits. ' 226 Additionally, efforts to implement reforms that
focus on more substantive issues can become overly complicated and
lead to increased costs without clear benefits. 227 Given the inherent
Id. at 767.
222. See de Larosi~re Group, High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, at 27,
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal market/finances/docs/delarosiere-report-en.pdf.
223. See generally Unterman, supra note 181.
224. Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004
U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 18 (2004).
225. J. Robert Brown, Jr., Corporate Governance, the Securities and Exchange Commission,
and the Limits of Disclosure, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 45, 79-80 (2007).
226. Aaron Unterman, Exploring Risk: Global Implications of the Securitization of U.S. Hous-
ing Debt, 4 HASTNGS Bus. L.J. 77, 109 (2008).
227. Many scholars have sharply criticized the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for precisely these reasons.
In his analysis of the legislative response to the corporate scandals of the early 2000s that led to
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weaknesses of disclosure, as well as the financial ingenuity that is usu-
ally one step ahead of regulators, other methods of influencing behav-
ior are necessary to prevent overly risky behavior that damages the
public good. According to one expert, "it is also clear that far too
many members of the industry behaved extremely recklessly and
greater mechanisms of deterrence could have prevented at least some
of the pain being felt now."' 228 Investors can be also be misled during
times of economic expansion, underestimating risks and placing too
much trust in the markets. "Since trust is a behavioral phenomenon,
the behavioral biases that contribute to investor euphoria and the de-
velopment of a bubble can lead to an excess of trust in the integrity of
market participants." 229 Financial regulation inherently suffers from a
free rider problem with an incentive to permit questionable practices
as long as such behavior is tolerated by other regulators. 230 Further,
regulators are often reluctant to discourage banks from lending during
asset bubbles since doing so could lead to a crisis.231 Likewise, gov-
ernment may also be reluctant to alert voters to asset bubbles.232
Bubbles actually trigger "political pressure to deregulate financial
markets and dilute securities regulation... [which] manifests itself not
only in efforts to roll back laws that would otherwise deter fraud, but
also in under-enforcement of existing laws and resistance to proposals
to address concerns about speculation or the growing risk of fraud. '233
For these reasons, it is all the more important that national regulators
work together to avoid a free rider problem as well as to de-politicize
regulation which may stifle short-term innovation but protect long-
term wealth.
Prior to the financial crisis, many of the largest banks were regis-
tered with the SEC and therefore required to file periodic and annual
the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Professor Coffee notes, "The only effective antidotes to
fraud are active and vigilant markets and professionals with strong incentives to investigate cor-
porate managers and dig up corporate information." See Ribstein, supra note 63, at 3. See gen-
erally Naidu, supra note 24; John Gibeaut, New Twists in Sarbanes-Oxley May Compel More
Smaller Companies to Exit the Market, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2005, at 20; Cory L. Braddock, Penny
Wise, Pound Foolish: Why Investors Would Be Foolish to Pay a Penny or a Pound for the Protec-
tions Provided by Sarbanes-Oxley, 2006 BYU L. REV. 175 (2006).
228. Unterman, supra note 181, at 80.
229. Gerding, supra note 188, at 421.
230. Professor Wilmarth has summarized the regulatory failures that led to the subprime
mortgage crisis accurately and succinctly: "Over the past decade, regulators in developed nations
encouraged the expansion of large financial conglomerates and failed to restrain their pursuit of
short-term profits through increased leverage and high-risk activities." Wilmarth, supra note
203, at 1049.
231. JOHN CALVERLEY, BUBBLES AND HOW TO SURVIVE THEM 167 (2004).
232. Id.
233. Gerding, supra note 188, at 395.
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reports. Yet, such disclosure failed to protect investors from a loss of
$8 trillion on the U.S. equity markets alone. 234 Rather than continue
the cyclical pattern of lax regulation during periods of rapid economic
growth followed by the adoption of a hodgepodge of new draconian
national laws which might do little to deter future detrimental behav-
ior, the legislatures and securities regulators should agree to interna-
tional standards of liability that will act to cure these market extremes.
While this might appear overly ambitious, the alternative is to con-
tinue the ineffective, but politically expedient adoption of yet further
regulations that are powerless to predict the next financial crisis. Fi-
nancial regulators charged with ensuring efficient markets have been
unable to provide regulatory supervision sufficient to prevent finan-
cial crises, and market participants are not deterred from the current
liability regime. Indeed, many argue that penalties and the possibility
of liability are already too high. In U.S. law, Rule 10b-5 has become
synonymous with harsh regulation. The U.S. SEC also has a "reputa-
tion as a ruthless enforcer with a 'take no prisoners' mentality. ' 235
However, others have pointed out that the SEC has not always been
aggressive in prosecuting wrongdoing. 236 For example, in the case of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC is sometimes reluctant to impose
penalties since any penalties assigned to a corporation "ultimately...
are borne by shareholders. ' 237 Closer examination shows that crimi-
nal prosecutions under 10b-5 "consistently offer[ ] neither effectual
retribution nor effective deterrence. '238 However, "[c]orporate fraud
scandals continue in the United States and resulting damages are
growing, even with current regulations in place. ' 239 In addition, the
234. Lisa H. Nicholson, The Culture of Under-Enforcement: Buried Treasure, Sarbanes-Oxley
and the Corporate Pirate, 5 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 321, 323 (2007).
235. Eugene F. Moloney, Banks and the SEC: A Regulatory Mismatch?, 25 ANN. REV. BANK-
ING & FIN. L. 443, 455 (2006). However, the SEC has often been regarded as less aggressive in
pursuing possible violations.
236. See generally Jonathan R. Macey, Wall Street in Turmoil: State-Federal Relations Post-
Eliot Spitzer, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 117. 118 (2004).
237. Atkins & Bondi, supra note 99, at 398. The authors describe Section 308's Fair Fund
distribution in the following manner: "The Fair Fund distribution thus creates a circular situa-
tion: The Commission penalizes a corporation to put the money into a fund to reimburse the
shareholders who were themselves just indirectly penalized." Atkins & Bondi, supra note 99, at
398 n.171.
238. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Hell Hath No Fury Like an Investor Scorned: Retribution,
Deterrence, Restoration, and the Criminalization of Securities Fraud Under lOb-5, 2 J. Bus. &
TECH. L. 3, 7 (2007).
239. See Shelley Thompson, The Globalization of Securities Markets: Effects on Investor Pro-
tection, 41 INT'L LAW. 1121, 1126 (2007). Thompson argues that the dramatic litigation settle-
ments in recent years "are not driven by frivolous litigation," but rather by the "massive fraud"
by particular companies, including the $6.2 billion WorldCom settlement out of a total of $9.4
billion in securities litigation settlements in 2005. Id. at 1125. Thompson further notes that "[o]f
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European regulatory framework suffers from a lack of cohesiveness
owing to the various cultural and legislative practices among member
states that lead to uneven enforcement of common directives.240 For
example, the Transparency Directive only sets minimum standards
which member states may enhance, thereby creating room for varia-
tions among member states with regard to ongoing disclosure obliga-
tions.241 In addition, where EU securities law harmonization leaves
member states no room for substantive variation in the design of na-
tional regulation, the fact that its private and public enforcement is
almost purely a matter for the member states means that, in sum, dif-
ferences in national securities law regimes are of significant relevance
even with regard to the detailed prescriptions of EU directives. For
example, in the U.K., the FSA is guided by principle-based regula-
tion242 that seeks, where possible, to avoid prescriptive rules which
have not been able to prevent misconduct.243 However, the FSA has
been criticized that its "light touch" principle-based regulation ap-
proach has been a primary catalyst for the failure of major U.K. banks
and financial institutions as well as the collapse of the U.K. securitiza-
tion market since the summer of 2007.244 Only rigorous sanctions that
are administered fairly and consistently can provide the deterrence
necessary to discourage overly risky behavior.
Rather than vigorously enforcing sanctions, the SEC and other reg-
ulators have been lax in prosecuting violations. The past three de-
the $17.2 billion in settlements in 2006, $7.1 billion came from the Enron settlement alone." Id.
at 1125-26.
240. See de Larosire Group, supra note 222, at 27.
241. See Enriques & Gatti, supra note 112, at 69. Additionally, the Takeover Bids Directive
leaves the determination of the threshold percentage which activates the mandatory bid and its
calculation to member states and allows defensive measures to both the restrictions for the tar-
get's board deterring hostile bids and to the breakthrough rule that suspends voting caps and
transfer restrictions. See Christian Kirchner & Richard W. Painter, Takeover Defenses Under
Delaware Law, the Proposed Thirteenth EU Directive and the New German Takeover Law: Com-
parison and Recommendations for Reform, 50 Am. J. COMP. L. 451, 469 (2002).
242. See generally FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, PRINCIPLES-BASED REGULATION: FO-
CUSING ON THE OUTCOMES THAT MATTER 6 (Apr. 2007), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/
other/principles.pdf. Principles-based regulation relies less on prescriptive rules and places
greater importance on high level principles to achieve regulatory goals. Id. The Turner Review
also reaffirms the importance of the principles-based framework for U.K. financial regulation.
See FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO
THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS (Mar. 2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner
review.pdf. For a full discussion of principle-based regulation, see Julia Black, Forms and Para-
doxes of Principles-Based Regulation, 3 CAP. MARKETS L.J. 425 (2008).
243. Kern Alexander, Principles v. Rules in Financial Regulation: Re-assessing the Balance in
the Credit Crisis Symposium at Cambridge University, 10 EUR. BUs. ORG. L. REV. 169, 171
(2008).
244. Id. at 169.
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cades have seen periods of economic bubbles accompanied by lax
enforcement of regulation followed by aggressive steps by legislatures
to adopt increased legislation. 245 "This cycle of decay and re-growth is
propelled by the dynamics of stock market bubbles and the epidemics
of fraud that they generate. '246 Moreover, recent financial crises have
seen the rise of a "new breed of corporate executives who are uncon-
strained by the traditional devices '247 of financial regulation. More
worrying, at least in the context of the subprime crisis, governments
have even tacitly endorsed and rewarded overly risky activities by
bailing out financial institutions. One expert describes the dilemma in
the following manner:
Allowing major institutions to profit from irresponsible financial
dealings and then intervening when they get in over their heads
makes it too easy for these firms to avoid the consequences of their
actions. Morally, this action is reprehensible because it bails out the
same people responsible for this crisis, inevitably with tax payer
money, and has the effect of privatizing profit and socializing
lOSS. 2 4 8
Against this background, the various national and international secur-
ities authorities and regulators should work to establish and enforce
common standards of liability which clearly define overly risky behav-
ior and then consistently enforce sanctions to provide an effective de-
terrent. In the absence of coordinated regulatory cooperation,
jurisdictions which adopt harsher financial regulations risk driving fi-
nancial goods and services to other jurisdictions. According to Profes-
sor Coffee, "disparities in enforcement may be able to explain what
marginal differences in formal legal rules or disclosure standards can-
not explain. ' 249 In so doing, "[t]hese cascade effects will add up very
quickly, carrying with them the potential to set up alternative business
regimes that are beyond regulation. 250 In addition, "the competition
between regulators is not necessarily geared towards achieving regula-
245. Gerding, supra note 188, at 448. Gerding criticizes regulatory responses to financial cri-
ses since they are often "just another episode of new securities laws designed to re-fight the last
war by seeking to prevent the unique schemes just committed." Gerding, supra note 188, at 448.
246. Gerding, supra note 188, at 394.
247. Ribstein, supra note 63, at 9. Ribstein identifies such executives in the aftermath of the
Enron scandal, noting that, "These executives are hyper-motivated survivors of a highly compet-
itive tournament... who have proven their ability to make money while putting on a veneer of
loyalty to the firm." Ribstein, supra note 63, at 9. Ribstein also observes a willingness of such
players to engage in risky transactions in a "corporate culture that instils loyalty to insiders" and
displays an "an obsession with short-term stock price." Ribstein, supra note 63, at 9.
248. Unterman, supra note 181, at 81.
249. Coffee, supra note 216, at 242.
250. Richard A. Epstein, The Dangers of "Investor Protection" in Securities Markets, 12 TEX.
REV. L. & POL. 411, 417 (2008).
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tion that is most optimal for the beneficiaries of the regulation 251
since the absence of common standards of liability exposes investors
to greater risks depending on the effectiveness of local regulators. In
a sense, "globalization of the markets results in less stable economies
and increased risk for investors around the world" with volatility in
one market increasingly affecting conditions in other markets.252
The IOSCO2 53 has led international efforts to harmonize the regula-
tion of the capital markets 254 and could provide an impetus for na-
tional regulatory cooperation on establishing such a common
approach. With over one hundred seventy members, including both
governmental and private securities regulators, IOSCO has an infor-
mal structure2 55 and works to achieve "regulatory harmonization
through consensus. ''2 56 IOSCO has formulated an array of principles
and reports, largely through its Technical Committee.257 With regard
to disclosure standards,258 IOSCO published its International Disclo-
sure Standards for Cross-Border Offerings and Initial Listings by For-
eign Issuers in 1998259 to encourage harmonization. The SEC adopted
these standards in 1999, by revising its Form 20-F, the form which out-
lines foreign issuers' disclosure and accounting requirements. 260 Fol-
lowing these efforts to cooperate in the area of disclosure, IOSCO
should focus its attention on establishing an international liability
standard that will be an effective deterrent against future overly risky
behavior in the financial markets. The introduction and enforcement
of a common international standard for liability would help to limit
the ability of companies to engage in regulatory arbitrage. Likewise,
such a common liability standard would enhance the scope of cooper-
ation among national regulators in enforcing their respective securi-
ties regimes.
251. Chiu, supra note 8, at 765.
252. Thompson, supra note 239, at 1127.
253. See generally IOSCO, http://www.iosco.org/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2011).
254. In May 2003, IOSCO published its Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation
which seeks to protect investors, encourage efficient and fair markets and minimize risks. See
IOSCO, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION, http://www.iosco.org/
library/pubdocs/pdfIIOSCOPD154.pdf.
255. David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Administration, 5 CHI.
J. INT'L L. 547, 562 (2005).
256. Id. at 565.
257. Id. at 564.
258. See Roberta S. Karmel, Will Convergence of Financial Disclosure Standards Change SEC
Regulation of Foreign Issuers, 26 BROOK. J. Irr'L L. 486, 492 (2000).
259. See IOSCO, INTERNATIONAL DISCLOSURE STANDARDS FOR CROss-BORDER OFFERINGS
AND INITIAL LISTINGS BY FOREIGN ISSUERS (Sept. 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/
offices/oialoiacorpfin/crossborder.pdf.
260. See Zaring, supra note 255, at 567.
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The current research concedes that defining particular behavior to
be discouraged is necessarily difficult, and the legislature and financial
regulators must work in concert to determine what standards to adopt.
Under U.S. law, § 24 of the Securities Act assigns criminal liability to
"[a]ny person who wilfully violates" its provisions or rules and regula-
tions adopted by the SEC thereunder. 261 However, the precise defini-
tion of "wilfully" remains elusive, with both courts and legal experts
grappling over various formulations.2 62 This regulatory lacunae neces-
sarily leaves market participants open to develop practices without ad-
equate guidance from regulators. It is therefore disingenuous of
legislatures to create new laws in reaction to financial abuses without
adequately providing standards that would have deterred such behav-
ior in the first place. Without a robust legal regime to discourage
overly risky behavior that can harm the public good, disclosure alone
will be ineffective.2 63 Without vigorous enforcement, these penalties
lack a deterrent effect as one expert eloquently points out:
The politicians appear to rely on the notion that potential offenders
will be deterred from engaging in wrongdoing because they will fear
longer terms of incarceration. This rationale relies on the faulty as-
sumption: that these lengthy terms of imprisonment and high fines
actually will be meted out. Numerous variables play a role in deter-
mining the actual sentence imposed by the courts ... which enables
greater judicial discretion in sentencing offenders. 264
In response to the financial crisis, the FSA has taken a more aggres-
sive approach, pledging to engage in enforcement actions as a "credi-
ble deterrence" tool against rogue firms or individuals. 265 These
aggressive actions by the FSA and the SEC in the wake of the finan-
cial crisis go a long way to restoring investor confidence in the market.
However, these steps in the U.S. and U.K. fall short of a concerted
approach to liability in the international regulation of securities. As
has been argued above, only such a unified, consistent approach to
liability and enforcement will deter future crises.
261. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77x (LexisNexis through P.L. 111-359 (with a gap of P.L. 111-350)).
262. See generally Michael L. Seigel, Bringing Coherence to Mens Rea Analysis for Securities-
Related Offenses, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 1563 (2006). Professor Seigel summarizes various explana-
tions of the meaning of "wilfully," finally noting that the leading commentator on U.S. securities
law Louis Loss had "also failed to adequately address the interpretation of the word 'willfully' in
his seminal work on securities regulation." Id. at 1584-90.
263. See generally J. Robert Brown, Jr., Corporate Governance, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and the Limits of Disclosure, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 45 (2007). According to Profes-
sor Brown, "In the absence of strong underlying legal obligations, the use of disclosure as a tool
to regulate substantive behavior is far less effective." Id. at 79.
264. Nicholson, supra note 234, at 344.
265. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING
CRISIS 21 (Mar. 2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp09_02.pdf.
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IV. CONCLUSION
As investors have unprecedented access to opportunities around
the globe, financial crises which begin in a particular sector or market
have the potential to spill over into other sectors and markets. The
global repercussions of the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis illustrate the
interdependence of the modern international financial system and the
speed with which localized problems can spread.
The history of financial regulation has been punctuated by regula-
tors chasing after ever more innovative bankers and the products
which earn their bonuses. "The only effective antidotes to fraud are
active and vigilant markets and professionals with strong incentives to
investigate corporate managers and dig up corporate information. ' 266
While sunlight continues to be the best disinfectant, securities regula-
tion systems based on disclosure could be substantially strengthened
by adopting - and consistently enforcing in times of both boom and
bust - stricter liability for fraudulent and overly risky investment ac-
tivities, which could help to disincentivize reckless behavior.
266. See Ribstein, supra note 63, at 3.
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